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Summary 
At the invitation of the belli.gerenr P.arties, the United Nation.s became 
an active participant in efforts to end ihe war in Croatia. To bring peace 
to Croatia, the UN Security Council expressed its readiness to send its 
military formations to Croatia and deploy them in the crisis ares. It must 
be said that the withdrawal of Yugoslav Army forces from Croatian terrirorr. 
was especially important for the Republic of Croatia, and this is one of 
rhe key point.~ of the plan. 
The UN forces came to Croatia in two stages with related substages. 
The first stage meant getting to know the lie of i:he land, the deployment 
of headquarters and logistics and planning the deploY!Ilent of ON units. 
The second stage of the peace activities bC~ in the first week of April, 
simultaneously 10 all the protected zones. In this stage the peace o_peration 
could no longer easily oe stopped, regardless of the frequent breaches 
of the cease fire. The implementation or the peace operation in fact started 
with the third stage, wlltch was very important for tts further course. The 
course of the peace operation according to an advance scenario, and its 
len~, depended on the complete and successful implementation of this 
thir<I stage. lt is characterized by complete insight into the operative 
situation, the lie of the land and constant maintenance of connections 
and cooperation with the belligerent parties in the sector of activities. 
This is a stage if! ~hich the UNPROFOR should have worked completely 
mdependentfy wnhm Its mandate. The fifth stage meant extendmg or 
decreasing the UNPROFOR mandate, and the sixth stage was to have 5een 
the last, the end of the peace operation. 
In each of the stages that have been completely or partly implemented, 
UNPROFOR met willi different problems. UNPROFOR members were 
constandy in danger of losing their lives: because of mines, sudden 
ambushes and kidnapping. These and other ch.allenges to the P.frsonal 
safecy of peace-force members were geared at creaung fear ana tryin.g 
to slow down the peace operation. Ttie paramilitary formations in areas 
under UNPROFOR protection could not be disarmed in a one-year 
mandate, which was shown when hostilities were renewed at rhe 
beginning of 1993 in South Sector. 
There are many ways and means to resolve hostilities peacefully, including 
the mediation of the United Nations Organization (UN) or international regional 
organizations. Peacekeeping forces are one of the more important ways of 
preventing the escalation of massive hostilities in a certain region. After the war 
in Croatia in 1991 and the beginning of 1992, the engagement of peacekeeping 
forces was greeted with great-relief. 
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One of the key issues in the war against Croaria was the question of how 
it would end. There were many forecru.ts, ranging from those anticipating a great 
Croatian vietory to those that foresaw Crna(ian defeat in a war against, at the 
beginning of aggression, the technically superior Serbian force~. Time showed that, 
in spire of many problems, the Croatian defence managed to hair the aggression 
and prevent new onslaughts by the Serbian army. As the war continued the 
Croatian forces would certainly have gaiJled the upper hand on rhe bacrlefleld, 
but rhe liberation of all occupied Croarian territories would certainly not have 
ended without great struggles and sacrifice. 
It is not very probable that the desire of the hostile parties in this war to 
crush their enemy on the barrlefield will come true. Therefore tbe UN, at their 
invitation, became actively involved in crearing conditions for ending the war in 
Croatia. The UN Securiry Council decided ro send i.ntemarional armed forces into 
Croatia and deploy them in the crisis areas to secure peace. According to rhe 
Peace Plan, these are "areas in which the Serbs arc the majority or a significant 
minority population and where tension among the communities has led to armed 
conflict in the recent past. As has already been said, the special arrangement~ 
in rhese areas would have a temporary character and would not prejudice the 
outcome of political negotiations for reaching an overall resolution uf the Yugoslav 
crisis."1 The Peace Plan defined tbe foUowing United Nations Protected Area<> 
(UNPAs): Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and "Krajina", which includes the 
municipality of Beli Manastir, the area of Osijek ro the east of the town of Osijek, 
Vukovar, some villages in the easte.rnmost area of Vmkovci, the municipalities of 
GrubiSno Polje. Daruvar, Pakrac. the wesrem part of the municipalities of Nova 
Gradislca. the eastern pan of the municipality of Novska, Kostajnica, Petrinja, Dvor 
na Uni, Glina, Vrginmosr, VojniC, Slunj, Titova Korenica, Donji Lapac. Graeac, 
Obrovac, Benkovac and Knin.2 The exact boundaries of the UNPAs were established 
by UN advance parties after consultation with local authorities, before the 
deployment of th.e forces began. 
What are the main provisions uf the UN Peace Plan for ending the war in 
Croalia? They were especially emphasized in the Secretary General's Report of 
5 February 1992. The report mentions rwo basic provisions: (1) "withdrawal of 
the Yugoslav Army from the whole of Croatia and the demilitarization of the 
UNPAs" and (2) "tbe continuation of work, on a temporary basis, of existing 
municipality councils and police, under UN supervision". Another essential element 
of the report referred ro rhe conditions to be honoured if the world organization 
was to send peacekeeping forces to Croatia: (1) "UN forces will not withdraw 
until an overall politieal resolution of the Yugoslav crisis is foundn (which implies 
the continuation of the peace conference on Yugoslavia under the auspices of the 
European Community), {2) "The arrival of peacekeeping forces does not prejudice 
the outcome of political pro<:esscs - on the contrary, it is their goal to end hostilities 
and create conditions for the beginning of political negotiations", (3) "ln 
acknowledgement of existing local authorities and the maiJltenance of law and 
order in the UNPAs, the arrival of peacekeeping forces will not change the swtus 
' UN Peace Operation Plan for Yugoslavia, Provision 8, from: Medunarodna politilm, 
no. 1001, p. 10. 
l The areas under UN protection are listed according to the UN Peace Operation 




qud', (4) 'The UNPAs will remporarily, until a solution is found. not be subject 
lO the laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia", (5) nuN forces will protect 
the local population and gu;u-antec irs safety during am.! after UNPA 
demilitarization". Al a :.-peech to the Sabor (Paraiament) of the Republic of Croatia 
concerning the plan, Mare Granic, vice-presidenr of the Croatian government, said 
the following: "Considering conditions at that time (before the Republic of Croalia 
had been recognized, s:r.), I think the plan expressed in great measure the Republic 
of Croatia's desire for the Yugoslav Army to definitely withdraw from Croatian 
territory, for all irregular, volunteer and paramilitary formations thar had come 
lO Croatia during the war ro depart, and the units of the so-called Serbian tcrriroria.l 
defence to be demobilized and disarmed. Right from !.he start we were dissatisfied 
with formulations aboul the local police force, but we must understand that the 
peacekeeping forces are coming to establish a cessation of hostilities, bring peace 
and protect human rights, not to solve political problems'? This altitude shows 
that a lot about the peace plan was unclear. 
It must be admitted thar Yugoslav Army withdrawal from Croarian territory 
was especially important for the Republic of Croatia (this was one of the key 
provisions of the plan) for three reasons at feast. rU'St, because this indirectly 
acknowledged the republican borders (withdrawal was to be into Serbia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Montenegro). Second, its withdrawal autumarically meanr the 
liberation of areas to which peacekeeping forces were not to come (the 
mwlicipalities of Dubrovnik, Sinj, Drni!, Biograd Zadar). According to the peace 
plan "any YA unit in other parts of Croatia will~ transferred inro places outside 
that republic ... All Serbian territorial, para·milirary, irregular and volunteer Wlits 
(except those that are to be disbanded and demobilized in the UNPAs) will in 
a similar manner withdraw from Croatia. This wirhdrawal will be verified by UN 
military observers".• And third, the withdrawal horn Croatia of the Yugoslav Anny 
and all the newly·arrived armed volunteer units and the demobilization of the 
local territorial defence was to destroy the foundations on which local Serbian 
leaders built their rule. UnfonunareJy, in the implement:-cition of the peacekeeping 
operation in 1992 and the beginning of 1993 this did not happen. 
Besides the demobilization of local forces and the with- drawal of the Yugoslav 
Army, the areas under UN protection were to have been demilitariz.ed. 11lere are 
two kinds of demilirarizati.on: completes and partial' , but the UN peace plan for 
3 Quotation from: Cvn:ila Vlat:ko, "Kome te kacige saruvati vlast" (Whose power 
will rne helmets preserve), Slobodna Hrvaab, 21 February 1992, p. 4 . 
• According to lhe UN Peace O!)eraliun Plan for Yugoslavia, provision 18. quoted 
from; Medunarodna poh'tika, no. 1001, p. 11. 
• Complere demilltariz.arion calls for the complete destruction of existing military 
facilities and no new military consm~crion as long as an area is considered demilitarized. 
ll prohibju any armed forces in lhe area, except a ~tire force necessary for maintaining 
internal law and order. No military education is allowed in a demilitarized area, no 
mWrary aircraft can fly over it, nor are any other miliraey activities allowed. 
6 Partial demilita.riurion prohibits new mllirary construction and armed forces are 
limit~~ (~eir number and deployrl)ent are establisned by intemationallreaty). ln partly 
de.1mlltam.ed areas the members of armed forces in most cases retain only hand weapons~ 
and all heavy weaponry is placed in s~al warehouses under the supervision or 
inremational or some other forces (not undet: the supervision of the forces file weapons 
belong to) . 
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Yugoslc.via did not specify which kind of demilitarization would be implemented. 
Some elements, however, allow us to conclude rhar demilitarization was to be 
paniaJ, because the plan called for the withdrawal of armed forces and their 
demobilization, not for the destruction of militaty facilities and fortifications (which 
were used by the UN forces to ~Tay in). 
Avoiding any decision about lhc fmal solution, the world organization perceived 
demilitarization as a process ro end hostilities and effect Yugoslav Army withdrawal 
from the rerrirory of the Republic of Croatia. This did not mean that rhose areas 
would remain permanently demilitarized, which wuulc.l be unfavourable for Croatia 
because lhcy arc its frontiers and strategically important for its defence, and places 
where it should have militaty forces. 
According ro official data, at the beginning of the peacekeeping operation the 
United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) included a roraJ of 13.240 mill~ 
personnel 521 police and 542 civilian employees. The military had 1.100 vehi-
cles ar rheir disposal, the police force and civilian observers 345 vehicles. 
UNPROFOR also had 2 passenger and 2 uansport aircraft. 4 medium and 2 light 
helicoftets. The UN forces had infantry weapons, armoured vehicles and light 
tanks. 1beir basic rask was to ensure in the four areas under UN protecrion (E. 
W, N, S) the implementation of lhe peace plan and a political resolution of the 
crisis. The UNPROFOR headquarters were in Sarajevo. General Satish Nabiar of 
India was appointed commander-in-chief, General Phillp Morrillon of France his 
second-in-command, Brigadier General Louis McKenzic of Canada was chief-of-
staff, and Cedrick Thornbcrry of lrcland was director of the civilian part of the 
operation. Colonel John Wilson of Au.~tralia was head of the military observers, 
Frederich Eckhardt was the mission's spokesman and Dimitrios Suros of Greece 
was the commander-in-chiefs aide for administrative affairs. After one year most 
of these officials for various reasons relinqujshed their positions to others. 
The operation engaged people from 29 UN member states. The peacekeeping 
forces comprised 12 infantry batta lions, one each from Argentina, Canada, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, Denmark. France, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Poland and Russia. Only Belgium and Luxembourg formed a joint battalion of 
mixed national composition. 
Canada provided an engineer batraJion, Fmland a consltUction battalion, a 
Dutch battalion was in charge of signals, Norwegian units controlted traffic. A 
logistics battalion came from Fran<:t', Great Britain sent a field hospital, the head· 
quarters were protected by a company from Sweden. UNPROFOR's main logistics 
supply base was to have been in Banja Luka. The sector commands were in ~eb, 
on Pleso Airport, and in Belgrade, in lhe Federal Executive Council building. 
The UN police force was to ensure law and order in the protected areas together 
with the local police. Civilian observers had the task of supezyising lhe return 
of displaced persons and refugees and protecting human rights in areas under 
UN prote<:tion. 
7 SiniSa 1alalo'ii~. "UNPROfOR oU Sara}eva do mira", (UNPROFOR from Sarajevo 
ro peace) , Vjesnik, 29 March 1992, p. 11. 
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The three UNPAs were divided inro four zones. The first E (east) zone · eastern 
Slavonia; the second W (west) zone wesrern Slavonia; l.he third N (north) 7.one 
- so-called nonhem Krajina and the fnurth S (south) zon.e · ~ed southern 
Krajina. Their commands were located in Dalj, Daruvar, Topusko and Knln. Each 
zone had one brigade composed of three infantry battalions. The battalions were 
ethnically homogeneous and divided into companies and platoons. Control points 
were set up in all the zones under UN protection ro control traffic and people 
entering and exiting the zone, and within the zones themselves. Local police, whose 
ethnic composition should have corresponded with lhe ethnic composition of the 
population as shO\'ffl by the 1991 census, were to have worked together wirh 
rhe UN police. Mosr trOOps came to the region called Krajina, battalions from 
France, Denmark, Poland, rhe Czech Republic and Slovakia, Kenya and Nepal. 
The French were deployed in the region of Knin and in the Zadar hinterland, 
although they had wanted to come to the BardJlja area. Battalions from Canada, 
Jordan, Argentina and Nepal were deployed in western Slavonia, battalions from 
Belgium/Luxembourg and Russia in eastern Slavonia. 
All these battalions were el.hnically homogeneous. For example, the Argentinean 
battalion comprised only Argentineans and covered a panicular area. This did not 
mean, however, rhat the Argentinean member of the UNPROFOR command could 
not be posted to a completely different 2.oneJ to a completely different area under 
UN protea:ion. He could have commanded a zone where there were no Argcntinean 
units, at all. The command was thus multinational, the battalions uni-national. 
The battalions were divided into companies, the companies lnro plawons, so thar 
a certain part of the crisis area was covered by units of one participant UN state. 
All the infantry banalions were from countries with a relatively long military 
tradition. The Russian battalion comprised the most elite paratrOOper units of the 
former Soviet anny, whose combat readiness had been rested in the Afghanistan 
war. The Nepalese are traditionally good soldiers and members of rhe Gurkha 
rribe have for years been recruitet:f for special British unirs. They are trained to 
fight under exceptionally harsh conditions lllld in rugged mounrain terrain. The 
Jordanese and Kenyan armies are modelled on the British army and unril gaining 
independence all their military training was supervised by British milirary expen:s. 
They retained this tradition. Members of the West-European forces are in most 
cases professional soldiers with military training according to NATO standards. 
All the UN troops were under orders from the headquaners in Sarajevo and 
New York. They did not come to the UNPAs as representatives of their countries 
nor were they to act as ~llcb, as people often thought. Therefore, any fear that 
a cerrain group within the UNPROFOR would act on their own was unfounded, 
although there were individual cases thar demonstrated the Ot>posire. The UN forces 
were not allowed to act to the detriment of either side m the conJlict. 
The decision to locate UNPROfOR Headquartefli in Sarajevo and the logistics 
base in Banja Luka indicated that the peacekeeping forces could very quickly and 
easily be transformed into protection forces in 13osnia-Hercegovina. This happened 
in April 1992, but iL did not Stop the escalation of bloody war. 
Roughly speaking, lhe UN operation in Croatia was planned in s.ix phases with 
the corresponding subphascs.• The first phase covered inv~1igating and 
1 SiniS.a Tatalovic, •Sest kljufuih faz:a operacije UNPROFOR" (Six key phMes in the 
UNPROFOR operation), Vjesnik, S. April 1992, p. 10. 
T..-_ S.. Mililllry ~ -· CJ'SII. Vol. 2. No. 2. 1993. pp 55 83 60 
reconnoitering the terrain, deploying the commands and logistics and planning 
the deployment of UN troops. This me;mr organizing command on the local and 
regional (stare) levels and organizing the UNPROFOR headquaners in Sarajevo. 
In this phase the localities in which the UN troops were to stay were cleared 
of mines. This phase, or prephase. included the peace mission's political and 
operative-administrative preparations. It was the mol>t critical phase, because the 
launching itself of the peacekeeping mission depended on it. 
The second phase of the peacekeeping operation began in the first week of 
April 1992, simultaneously in all the protected zones. This means that, starting 
from 5 April, four battalions arrived each week, one to each of the four zones. 
All the forces were ro have been deployed by 25 April. However, this did not 
happen and lhe whole operation was several days late, which caused initial unease 
among the Croatian public. In this phase it would have been difficult to stop 
the peacekeeping operation, regardless of the frequent breaches of the cease-fire. 
As this was still a prepararory phase, UNPROFOR did not undertake any specific 
activities in the field. The civilian population continued to be killed and wounded 
on the temporarily occupied areas of Croatia and a picture of UNPROFOrt 
inefficiency began to be formed. In this phase of lhe peacekeeping operation the 
political leaderships of each of the hostile parties rried to win for themselves a 
better position than that held by their enemy. They both rried to show themselves 
in as good a light as ~ble to the UNPROFOR representatives and tried to 
discredit the enemy, t.rymg to gain the initial emorional bias of the peacekeeping 
forces. Because of the destroyed towns and villages and hundreds of thousands 
of ourcasrs, which the UNPROFOR members saw every day, especially after the 
beginning of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Croatia had an important advantage 
in this respect. 
The operative Implementation of the peacekeeping operaLion began with the 
third phase, which was very important for its further course. lts complete and 
successful execution governed nor only the course of lhc peacekeeping operation 
according to an advance scenario, but also its length. The most unporranr task 
in this phase was to discover, in cooperarion with the parries in the confli<:t. the 
critical points and areas suscept· ible to excesses, diversions, terrorism and even 
a renewal of hostilities. It was imponant to concentrate greater peacekeeping forces 
on these points and areas and accelerare the implementation of their mandate. 
In this phase the peacekeeping rroops adapred to the area in which they bad 
been deployed. They had come tor the first time into a completely unknown region 
and a cenain amount of time was necessary for them to adapt to the situation 
in the field, the climate, population and cusroms. To a certain extent their 
motivation to carry out the tasks ser before them depended on their successful 
adaptation. In this phase UNPROFOR was expected to achieve the first results. 
They were to clear the mine fields, open up communications in the UNPAs, reduce 
breaches of the cease-fire as much as possible, or completely eliminate them, and 
thus create the basic preconditions for the displaced and banished to return to 
their homes. Unfortunately, little of this has Leen achieved in the year-long peace 
operation."' 
9 This can be seen from the statement made by the UNPROFOR commander on leaving 
that position. He said that after UNPROFOR's year·long stay in Croatia Lhe siruarion was 
to a certain extent worse than lr had been before the peacekeeping forces had arrived. 
From: Vjesoik, 22 February 1993. 
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The founh phase of the peacekeeping operarion should have started after all 
the obstacles on any level had been removed that could hinder thP successful 
implcmentadon of the peace mission. It would have been characterized by complete 
insight into the operative situation and constant communication and cooperarion 
with the confronted parties within rhe zone or sector of responsibility. ln this 
phase UNPROFOR was to have acted completely independendy within its mandate, 
according to an organization approved by rhe Security Council and elaborated 
in detail by the peace mission's commander-in-chief. He was ro est:abl~h the work 
regime of UNPROrOR commands, me rotation and resr of me troops and many 
other questions. UNPROFOR was now to bave sraned to function as an independent 
autonomous organization capable of eliminatin~ all external (negative) influences. 
In this phase of the peacekeeping operation var1ous developments could have been 
expected, from the optimistic one that everything would run according to earlier 
agreements of both sides in the conflict and UNPROFOR, to the pessimistic in 
which nor onJy breaches of the cease-fire were possible, but a wider renewal of 
hostilities. There was fear that an unfavourable (apocalyptic) course of development 
in this phase might result from long-lasting and unproductive political negotiations 
which would exhaust rhe patience of the soldiers and the belief that the crisis 
could be peacefully resotved. Unfonunately, greaTly aided by events in the war 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina, this is exacrly what happened. 
In that phase, besides demilirari7.ation of the areas under UN prorecrion, there 
should have been a mASS rerum of refugees and displaced people into their homes 
and the estab~shmenr of_a legal order guaranteeing ~axil'!lum pr~tccUon of ~i~l 
and human nghts, especially those of members of mmonty ethmc commuruttes 
in those areas. The fifth phase of the peacekeeping operation depended on the 
success of the fourth. 
The fifth phase meant the expansion or diminishment of the UNPROFOR 
mandate. If the results of the preceding phase were modest and the existing 
mandalc difficult ro realize, rhe UN Security Council would expand me UNPROFOR 
mandate and increase the nwnber of troops. The number of ttoops were increased 
ro 25.000 because of lhe war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the UNPROFOR mandate 
was temporarily expanded after rhe renewa.l of hostilities in the Zadar hinterland.10 
The sixth phase was to have been the last and was conceived as rhe concluding 
part of the peacekeeping operation. There were various, more or less successful, 
ways in which the peacekeeping operation in former Yugoslavia could end. The 
most successful cod would be for its activities to enable political dialogue and 
diplomatic procedures between the hostile parties, which would have brought to 
a political resolution of the problem and the establishment of a lasting and stl!ble 
peace. The worst, but also possible, end of the peace mission would be if 
UNPROFOR, because of a badly planned or implemented mandate, became part 
of the war instead of a force for ending it, and thus additionally complicated 
and worsened the situation. Today another possibility has opened up. The 
peacekeeping mission will end if the Republic of Croatia revokes agreement for 
further UNPROFOR presence on its territory, if it estimates that UNPROPOll 
10 This was don.~ by Security Council Resolution 803. Resolution 815 prolonged the 
UNPROFOR mandar~ by three months to allow the continuation of polirical 
negotiations. 
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aCTivities arc not in its interest and ir can solve existing problems by itself. This 
step would certainly result in a negative international atrirude and would probably 
produce undesired consequences for Croatia. 
(f the peacekeeping operarion ends in an abrupt and unplanned manner, 
regardless of the possible reason, the sixth phase will be Lhe gradual and planned 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR. 
In each of the pha~ that have already been completely or partially 
implemented UNPROFOR was confronted with different problems. The personal 
safety of UNPROFOR members was consranrly threarened by mines, unexpected 
ambushes, cross-fire in cases of conflict, terrorist activities, threats and abduction. 
These and other threats to the personal safety of peacekeeping force members 
had rhe purpose or generating fear and slowing down the peacekeeping operation. 
The problem of disarming parcunilitary formations in rhe UNPAs could not be 
solved in a one-year mandate, which was demonstrated by the renewal of hostilities 
in the Southern Sector at the beginning of 1993. This was to have been expected 
because experience, from Lebanon for exam~le, shows this problem to be almost 
insoluble even with the support of local polit1cal elites. To dlsann the paramilitary 
units and lhe armed Serbian population will be one of the most difficult problems 
facing UNPROFOR in case of a new extended mandate. 
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